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A Survey of Judges’
Knowledge and Beliefs
About Eyewitness Testimony
Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer

F

orensic DNA testing suggests that potentially large numbers of innocent persons are being convicted of crimes.1
Case studies conducted both prior to and following the
advent of DNA testing indicate that eyewitness error is at least
partially responsible for the majority of wrongful convictions.
Empirical research has shown which factors contribute to eyewitness error and has identified procedural changes that could
be made in the criminal justice system to significantly reduce
the number of erroneous eyewitness identifications.2
We report the results of a brief survey of what U.S. judges
know and believe about eyewitness testimony. The present
survey highlights what judges already know about these eyewitness factors and procedural changes and indicates what
additional knowledge judges may need to significantly reduce
the number of wrongful convictions.
THE NUMBER OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

Although there is no precise figure, it is possible to suggest
lower and upper estimates for the annual number of wrongful
convictions in the Unites States. Almost 1 million persons
were convicted of felonies in the United States in 1998.3 Huff
surveyed criminal justice officials in Ohio and, based on their
answers, estimated that wrongful convictions occur in about 1
of every 200 felony criminal cases (.5%).4 Huff’s estimate
would translate into 5,000 wrongful felony convictions in
1998. However, DNA testing of criminal suspects suggests
that the percentage of wrongful convictions may be much
higher than .5%.
In 1995 a survey of public and private forensic laboratories
in the United States indicated that they had conducted DNA

Footnotes
Authors’ Note: This article is based on Richard A. Wise’s dissertation,
which was submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for a doctoral degree in psychology awarded by the Catholic University of
America. The internet version of the survey may be viewed at
http://research.cua.edu/eyewitness. Correspondence concerning this
article should be addressed to Martin A. Safer, Department of
Psychology, Catholic University of America, Washington, DC 20064.
E-mail: Safer@cua.edu.
1. See generally, Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the
Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635 (1999).
2. See John C. Brigham et al., Disputed Eyewitness Identification
Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 CT. REV.,
Summer 1999, at 12-25; see also Saul M. Kassin et al., On the
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tests in 21,621 criminal cases.5 DNA testing excluded suspects
in approximately 23% of the cases. The exclusion rate would be
about 27% if cases with inconclusive tests were omitted.
A number of studies have estimated that one-half of all persons charged with serious crimes are ultimately convicted.6
Accordingly, if the suspects cleared by DNA evidence are similar
to the suspects who would have been indicted prior to the widespread use of DNA testing, then there may have been a false conviction rate in the past of greater than 10% for cases where DNA
testing is now possible. Dripps asserts that DNA-exonerated
suspects are very similar to the persons who would have been
indicted prior to the use of DNA testing.7 More importantly,
Dripps argues that factors such as eyewitness error, which might
have led to wrongful indictments in DNA cases, continue to
produce wrongful indictments in the vast majority of criminal
cases where there is no testable biological evidence. A false conviction rate of 10% would imply almost 100,000 wrongful
felony convictions every year. Clearly, the high exclusion rates
in DNA testing of suspects, along with the well-publicized cases
of post-conviction DNA exonerations, challenge the presumption that wrongful convictions rarely occur. Indeed, they
strongly suggest that more innocent persons than previously
believed are being wrongfully convicted of felonies.
ERRONEOUS EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS

Eyewitness error occurs in half or more of all wrongful convictions. Thus, Borchard reported that eyewitness error
occurred in 45% of 65 cases of wrongful conviction,8 Huff
found eyewitness error in nearly 60% of approximately 500
wrongful convictions,9 and Rattner concluded that eyewitness

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

“General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New
Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405-16 (2001).
Criminal Sentencing Statistics (2002), U.S. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Statistics, http://www/ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sent.htm (last
visited August 19, 2002).
C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction: Societal Tolerance of
Injustice, 4 RES. IN SOC. PROBS. & PUB. POL’Y 99-115 (1987).
Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science:
Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After
Trial, Dep’t Justice, National Institute of Justice (1996).
See e.g., Dripps, supra note 1.
Id.
EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
Huff, supra note 4.

error occurred in 52% of 205 wrongful convictions.10 These
wrongful convictions studies were conducted before the invention of DNA testing, and the different authors included some of
the same cases in their analyses. Scheck et al. analyzed 62 cases
where DNA evidence exonerated persons convicted of felonies,
and they found that mistaken identifications were involved in
52 of the 62 cases (84%).11 Seventy-seven witnesses in these 52
cases had erroneously identified the defendants as the perpetrators of the crimes. At trial, these witnesses undoubtedly
appeared very confident in their identifications.
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EYEWITNESS FACTORS

Over the past 30 years, researchers have documented extensively many factors and procedures that can affect the accuracy
of eyewitness identification.12 For example, researchers have
shown that the presence of a weapon can impair an eyewitness’s
ability to accurately identify the perpetrator’s face;13 that an
eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by post-event experiences that are unrelated to identification accuracy;14 and that
a law officer who knows which member of a lineup or photo
array is the suspect can bias a witness’s selection.15 Researchers
have also developed new techniques for interviewing witnesses
that yield more complete reports, as well as identified simple
procedural changes that could be made in the criminal justice
system, which would reduce the number of eyewitness identification errors.16
The present study is the first to determine judges’ knowledge about a wide range of factors and procedures that affect
eyewitness accuracy. Judges also indicated what they believe
jurors know about eyewitness factors, and what legal safeguards they would permit attorneys to use to inform jurors
about the effects of eyewitness factors on identification accuracy. Judges’ answers to these two questions are important
because research indicates that jurors do not know how many
eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy.17 Research has
also shown that expert testimony is the only legal safeguard
that is effective in sensitizing jurors to eyewitness factors.18
Nonetheless, the most common reason judges give for excluding eyewitness expert testimony at trial is that the expert’s testimony is within the knowledge of the jury19 and, therefore,
“would not assist the trier of fact.”

10. Arye Rattner, Convicted But Innocent, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 28393 (1988).
11. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
12. See Gary Wells et al., From Lab to the Police Station: A Successful
Application of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581-98
(2000).
13. Elizabeth Loftus et al., Some Facts about “Weapon Focus,” 11 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 55-62 (1987); see also Nancy M. Steblay, A MetaAnalytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
413-24 (1992).
14. See C. A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary Wells, The Malleability of
Eyewitness Confidence: Co-witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714-23 (1994); John S. Shaw, Increases in
Eyewitness Confidence Resulting from Postevent Questioning, 2 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 126-46 (1996).
15. Mark R. Phillips et al., Double-Blind Photoarray Administration as

In summary, our surResearch has shown
vey may help identify
some facets of eyewitness that expert testimony
testimony where judges
is the only legal
need additional training.
safeguard that is
It may also give some
indication of how accu- effective in sensitizing
rately judges perceive
jurors to eyewitness
jurors’ knowledge of eyefactors.
witness testimony, and
how willing they are to
permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony.
METHOD

A request to complete a brief, anonymous ten-minute questionnaire on eyewitness testimony was distributed on the listserves of the American Judges Association and the Judicial
Division of the American Bar Association. Judges were
informed that they could complete the survey on the linked
website, print out the survey from the website and mail it, or
request a copy of the survey from its authors and then return it
by mail.
We obtained 143 completed questionnaires on the website
and 17 completed paper surveys, for a total sample of 160. The
respondents included 142 state judges, 10 federal judges, 7
retired judges, and 1 Indian tribal judge. There were 146 trial
judges, 6 appellate judges, and 8 (mainly the retired judges)
who did not indicate their current position. Prior to becoming
judges, 22 respondents had been prosecutors (14%), 42 had
been defense attorneys (26%), 57 had been both prosecutors
and defense attorneys (36%), and 39 had not practiced criminal law (24%). Respondents had practiced law for an average
of 13.96 years and had been on the bench for an average of
12.48 years.
The questionnaire covered many key issues about eyewitness testimony. The judges were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with 14 statements about eyewitness factors and procedures, to answer 4 other related questions, and to
provide personal background information that was summarized in the preceding paragraph. The eyewitness factors and
procedures in the 14 statements were selected because of strong

16.
17.

18.

19.

a Safeguard Against Investigator Bias, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 94051 (1999).
See Wells, supra note 12.
See e.g., R. C. Lindsay et al., Mock Juror Belief of Accurate and
Inaccurate Witnesses, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333-39 (1989) [hereinafter Lindsay (1989)]; R. C. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?,
66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79-89 (1981) [hereinafter Lindsay (1981)];
Gary Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in
Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440-48 (1979)
[hereinafter Wells (1979)].
See Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Preventing Mistaken
Convictions in Eyewitness Identification Trials, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 89-118 (Ronald Roesch et al.
eds., 1999).
Cindy J. O’Hagen, Note, When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for
Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 758 (1993).
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empirical evidence on how they affect identification accuracy,
and because they describe issues that occur frequently in criminal trials. For 5 of the eyewitness statements, the judges also
indicated how they believed the average juror would answer
the statement and what legal safeguards they would permit
attorneys to use to inform jurors about the effects of the eyewitness factors on identification accuracy. For 8 of the eyewitness statements (Statements 3, 5-11), we were able to compare
the judges’ responses to those of 64 experts on eyewitness testimony.20 The experts answered whether the eyewitness statement was sufficiently reliable for an expert to testify about in
court and whether knowledge of how the factor affects identification accuracy is a matter of common sense.
RESULTS

We first report the judges’ responses to the 14 statements
about eyewitness factors and the 4 related questions, and where
appropriate, we provide a brief justification for the correct
answer. We have renumbered the statements from the original
survey to improve the clarity and conciseness of this report. In
Tables 1, 2, and 5, an asterisk next to a response indicates a correct answer. Percentages were rounded to the nearest whole
number and, therefore, may not total exactly 100% for every
statement. In calculating percent correct, we combined the
judges’ responses of “strongly agree” and “agree,” as well as the
responses of “strongly disagree” and “disagree,” because judges
rarely responded, “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree.”

EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 1-6

1. It is significantly harder for a witness of a crime to recognize a perpetrator who is wearing a hat during the
commission of a crime than a perpetrator who is not
wearing a hat. Even simple disguises can reduce identification accuracy.21 A hat disguises hair and facial shape,
which are important cues to recognizing a person’s face.22
Only 45% of the judges correctly answered that it is significantly harder to recognize a perpetrator who is wearing a
hat. (See Table 1, row 1.)
2. A witness’s ability to recall minor details about a crime
is a good indicator of the accuracy of the witness’s identification of the perpetrator of the crime. Memory for
minor or peripheral details is inversely related to eyewitness
accuracy, because an eyewitness who attends to peripheral
details has fewer resources available to process the perpetrator’s face.23 Only 24% of the judges correctly disagreed with
this eyewitness statement. The majority of judges (57%)
mistakenly believed that an eyewitness’s ability to recall
peripheral details about a crime indicates that the witness
has a better memory than a witness who cannot recall
peripheral details.
3. An eyewitness’s perception and memory for an event
may be affected by his or her attitudes and expectations.
Expectancies can exert a powerful influence on attention
and recall of relevant information.24 In the Kassin survey,

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES’ RESPONSES TO EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 1-6

Topic
1. Effects of a hat
2. Minor details
3. Attitudes & expectations
4. Conducting lineups
5. Effects of postevent information
6. Confidence-accuracy

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly disagree

6%*
4%
26%*
25%*
17%*

39%*
53%
69%*
38%*
67%*

50%
20%
4%
18%
8%

6%
22%*
1%
20%
6%

0%
2%*
1%
1%
1%

3%

31%

34%

28%*

5%*

Note: The asterisks next to the responses in the table indicate the correct answers.

20. See Kassin, supra note 2.
21. See generally K. E. Patterson & A. D. Baddeley, When Face
Recognition Fails, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING &
MEMORY 406-17 (1977); Peter N. Shaprio & Steven D. Penrod,
Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL.
139-56 (1986).
22. Brian L. Cutler et al., Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness
Identification: Putting Context into Context, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
629-37 (1987); Brian L. Cutler et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness
Identifications: The Role of System and Estimator Variables, 11 LAW
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& HUM. BEHAV. 223-58 (1987).
23. See Gary Wells & Michael R. Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer
the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications? Using Memory for
Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 682-87
(1981); BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN
IDENTIFICATIONS: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW
(1995).
24. Edward R. Hirt et al., Expectancies and Memory: Inferring the Past
from What Must Have Been, in HOW EXPECTANCIES SHAPE
EXPERIENCE 93-124 (Irving Kirsch ed., 1999).

92% of the eyewitness experts agreed that this statement
was sufficiently reliable to present in court.25 Of the judges,
95% agreed with this statement, and, therefore, there was no
significant difference between the experts’ and judges’
responses to this statement.
4. A police officer who knows which member of the lineup
or photo array is the suspect should not conduct the
lineup or photo array. A lineup administrator can intentionally or unintentionally influence a witness to select the
suspect from a lineup or photo array.26 In the survey, 63% of
the judges correctly answered that a lineup administrator
should not know who is the suspect. However, in most
criminal cases, the police officer who conducts the lineup
knows which lineup member is the suspect, and the police
are reluctant to change this practice.27
5. Eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not
only what a witness actually saw but information
obtained later on. Post-event information can influence
eyewitnesses’ description of a crime, their description of the
perpetrator of the crime, and which member of a lineup
they identify as the perpetrator.28 Altogether, 84% of the
judges correctly agreed with this statement, as did 94% of
the eyewitness experts, which is not a significant difference.

6. At trial, an eyewitness’s confidence is a good predictor of
his or her accuracy in identifying the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime. This is a particularly important
statement because jurors rely heavily on eyewitness confidence in evaluating identification accuracy.29 However, by
the time of trial, eyewitness confidence has little probative
value because of the many post-identification factors that
affect confidence, but have no effect on identification accuracy.30 (See also statement 5 for the effects of post-event
information and statement 7 for a discussion of “confidence
malleability.”) Almost all eyewitness experts would disagree
with Statement 6.31 In sharp contrast, there was little consensus among the judges on this critical question. Only
33% of the judges correctly disagreed, 34% wrongly agreed,
and 34% neither agreed nor disagreed. Clearly, the correct
answer to this very important issue is not a matter of “common sense.”
EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 7-11

For eyewitness statements 7 through 11, the judges
answered for themselves, as well as for how they believed the
average juror would respond to the eyewitness statement. In
Table 2, the percentages in italics before the slash are what the
judges believed about the eyewitness statement. Percentages
after the slash are what the judges believed the average juror

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES’ RESPONSES TO EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 7-11,
AND WHAT JUDGES BELIEVE JURORS KNOW ABOUT THESE STATEMENTS

Topic
7. Confidence malleability
8. Weapon focus
9. Mug-shot-induced bias
10. Lineup format
11. Forgetting curve

Generally true

Generally false

Jurors do not know

90%* / 36%
69%* / 24%
74%* / 38%
19%* / 4%
31%* / 18%

1% / 4%
4% / 9%
4% / 3%
15% / 6%
25% / 13%

—- / 32%
—- / 37%
—- / 28%
—- / 29%
—- / 30%

Note: The asterisks next to the responses in the table indicate the correct answers. The percentages in italics before the slash are what the judges believed
about the eyewitness statements. The percentages after the slash are what the judges believed the average juror thinks about the statement. “I don’t know”
responses by judges, either as to their own knowledge or indicating they did not know what jurors would understand about an issue, are not reported here.

25. Kassin, supra note 2.
26. See Lynn Garrioch & C. A. Elizabeth Brimacombe, Lineup
Administrator’s Expectations: Their Impact on Eyewitness
Confidence, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 299-315 (2001); Phillips,
supra note 15.
27. Wells, supra note 12.
28. See Robert E. Christiaansen et al., Influencing Eyewitness
Descriptions, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 59-65 (1983); Elizabeth F.
Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May Be
Contagious, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 323-34 (1980); ELIZABETH F.
LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
29. Gary Wells et al., Eyewitness Identifications Procedures:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 603-47 (1998).
30. John S. Shaw III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent

Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629-53 (1996); Wells, supra note 29.
31. The Kassin experts actually rated the statement “An eyewitness’s
confidence is not a good predictor of his or her identification
accuracy.” Kassin, supra note 2. In the judges’ survey, we slightly
rewrote the statement as well as added the introductory phrase “at
trial” because judges are likely to be confronted with this issue at
trial rather than in the investigatory phase of a case. Altogether,
87% of the experts thought that the lack of a strong relationship
between confidence and accuracy was a reliable enough fact to
present in courtroom testimony. Because witness confidence
becomes even less predictive of accuracy over time (see statement
7 on confidence malleability), we suspect that nearly 100% of the
experts would have disagreed with the modified confidence-accuracy statement in the judges’ survey.
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thinks about the statement. The correct answer for each of
these five statements is “generally true.” (See Tables 2 and 3.)
7. An eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by factors
that are unrelated to identification accuracy. Factors such
as post-event questioning, witness preparation and rehearsal,
and confirming feedback can greatly increase a witness’s confidence without a corresponding change in a witness’s accuracy.32 In Kassin’s survey, 95% of the eyewitness experts
agreed with this statement,33 as did 90% of the judges in the
current survey. This nearly unanimous agreement about the
effects of “confidence malleability” contrasts with the judges’
response to statement 6, where only 33% of the judges correctly disagreed with the statement, “At trial, an eyewitness’s
confidence is a good indicator of identification accuracy.”
Judges apparently do not fully appreciate the extent that confidence malleability can undermine the value of eyewitness
confidence as a predictor of eyewitness accuracy at trial.
Only 10% of the experts believed that the average juror
would be aware of the relationship between confidence malleability and eyewitness accuracy. In contrast, 36% of the
judges believed the average juror would think statement 7
to be generally true. Thus, a significantly larger percentage
of judges than experts thought that the average juror would
know the correct answer to this statement.
8. The presence of a weapon can impair an eyewitness’s
ability to accurately identify the perpetrator’s face. A
weapon impairs an eyewitness’s ability to identify the perpetrator of a crime.34 In the Kassin survey, 87% of the eyewitness experts agreed with this statement, and 34% of the
experts believed that understanding the statement was a
matter of common sense (i.e., the average juror would

understand the effect of weapon focus on eyewitness accuracy).35 Of the judges, 69% correctly believed this statement
was true, and 24% believed that jurors would think the
statement was true. In short, the percentage of judges who
agreed with this statement was significantly less than the
percentage of experts. However, their beliefs about whether
the average juror would know the correct answer did not
differ significantly from the experts.
9. Exposure to mug shots of a suspect increases the likelihood
that the witness will later choose the suspect from a lineup.
Researchers have shown that a witness who views a mug shot
of a suspect is more likely to later choose that person from a
lineup, in comparison to a witness who did not see the mug
shot.36 In Kassin’s survey, 95% of the eyewitness experts agreed
that there was a mug shot induced bias, and 13% indicated that
understanding it was a matter of common sense.37 Of the
judges, 74% agreed with the statement, and 38% responded
that the average juror was aware of the mug-shot-induced bias.
Thus, a significantly smaller percentage of judges than experts
agreed with this statement, but, a significantly larger percentage
of judges than experts believed that understanding the mugshot-induced bias is a matter of common sense.
10. Witnesses are more likely to misidentify someone in a
culprit-absent lineup when it is presented in a simultaneous (i.e., all members of a lineup are present at the
same time) as opposed to a sequential procedure (i.e., all
members of a lineup are presented individually). The traditional simultaneous lineup encourages witnesses to make
a relative judgment about which lineup member most
closely resembles the perpetrator of the crime.38 In sequential lineups, the eyewitness makes a yes-no decision about a

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPERTS’ RESPONSES TO EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 7-11,
AND WHAT THEY BELIEVE JURORS KNOW ABOUT THESE STATEMENTS (KASSIN, SUPRA NOTE 2).

Topic

The eyewitness statement is sufficiently reliable
for an expert witness to present in court.

7. Confidence malleability
8. Weapon Focus
9. Mug-shot-induced bias
10. Lineup format
11. Forgetting curve

95%
87%
95%
81%
83%

The correct answer is a
matter of common sense.
10%
34%
13%
0%
29%

Note: Copyright © 2001 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.

32. See generally Wells, supra note 29; Shaw & McClure, supra note
30; Gary Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Distortions in Eyewitnesses’
Recollections: Can the Postidentification-Feedback Effect Be
Moderated?, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI.138-44 (1999).
33. Kassin, supra note 2.
34. See Steblay, supra note 13; Patricia A. Tollestrup et al., Actual
Victims and Witnesses to Robbery and Fraud: An Archival Analysis,
in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND
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DEVELOPMENTS 144-160 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 1994).
35. Kassin, supra note 2.
36. See e.g., Evan Brown et al., Memory for Faces and Circumstances of
Encounter, 53 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 311-18 (1977).
37. Kassin, supra note 2.
38. See R. C. Lindsay & Gary Wells, Improving Eyewitness
Identification from Lineups: Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineup
Presentations, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 556-64 (1985).

lineup member without knowing the number or characteristics of other members in the lineup. Studies that have compared simultaneous and sequential lineups have consistently
found that sequential lineups significantly lower the risk of
false identifications compared to simultaneous lineups without reducing the number of accurate identifications.39
In Kassin’s survey, 81% of the experts agreed with a
slightly different phrasing of this statement, and 0%
thought it was a matter of common sense.40 Of the judges,
67% neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement,
which suggests that most of the judges are unfamiliar with
the differences between sequential and simultaneous lineups.41 Only 19% of the judges correctly agreed with the
statement, and 4% of the judges thought the average juror
would agree. Thus, the percentage of experts and judges
who agreed with this statement differed significantly.
However, a similar negligible percentage of experts and
judges believed that the answer to this statement was a
matter of common sense.

of the judges and experts
[T]he responses
differed significantly on
weapon focus, exposure to of the judges and
mug shots, lineup format,
experts differed
and the forgetting curve.
significantly on
Moreover, a significantly
weapon focus,
larger percentage of judges
than experts believed that exposure to mug
the correct answers to two
shots, lineup
of the five statements (conformat, and the
fidence malleability and
forgetting curve.
exposure to mug shots)
were a matter of common
sense. However, for each of the five statements, judges were
much more likely to know the correct answer themselves
than to believe that the average juror would know the correct answer. Thus the judges, like the eyewitness experts,
believe that knowledge of factors and procedures affecting
eyewitness testimony is not just a matter of common sense.

11. The rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right
after an event and then levels off over time. This statement describes the relatively rapid loss of memory for the
details of an event, such as a crime, which takes place shortly
after an event occurs.42 In the Kassin survey, 83% of the
experts agreed, and 29% of them stated that understanding
the forgetting curve was a matter of common sense.43 In contrast, only 31% of the judges agreed that it was generally
true, and 18% stated that the average juror would agree.
Moreover, 44% of the judges answered that they “don’t
know” the answer to this eyewitness statement. In sum,
there was a considerable difference between the percentage
of judges and experts who agreed with this statement. This
implies that a large number of the judges are unaware that an
eyewitness’s memory for the details of a crime decreases
rapidly shortly after the crime occurred. Similar percentages
of judges and experts believed that understanding the forgetting curve is not a matter of common sense.
In sum, for eyewitness statements 7-11, the responses

USE OF LEGAL SAFEGUARDS

39. See e.g., Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Improving the
Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Construction and
Presentation, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 281-90 (1988); Lindsay &
Wells, supra note 38; Nancy M. Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy
Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A MetaAnalytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459-73 (2001).
40. Kassin, supra note 2. Kassin’s eyewitness statement on lineup format stated: “Witnesses are more likely to misidentify someone by
making a relative judgment when presented with a simultaneous
(as opposed to sequential) lineup.” Furthermore, Kassin’s survey
of eyewitness experts was conducted prior to the publication of
Steblay’s meta-analytic review (see Steblay, supra note 39) that
showed that sequential lineups significantly lower the risk of false
identifications compared to simultaneous lineups without reducing the number of accurate identifications. If this review had
been published prior to the eyewitness experts completing
Kassin’s survey, undoubtedly a higher percentage of them would
have agreed that sequential lineups reduce the number of false

identifications compared to simultaneous lineups.
41. See Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective Is the Motion-to-Suppress
Safeguard? Judges’ Perceptions of the Suggestiveness and Fairness of
Biased Lineup Instructions, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 211-20 (1997).
42. Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, A Maturing of Research on the Behavior
of Eyewitnesses, 5 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 377-402 (1991).
43. Kassin, supra note 2.
44. Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification
Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185-91 (1990); Penrod &
Cutler, supra note 18. Several studies have shown that jury
instructions are ineffective in educating jurors about the effects of
eyewitness factors on identification accuracy. See Edith Greene,
Judge’s Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and
Revision, 18 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 252 (1988); Garbriella Ramierez,
Dennis Zemba, and R. Edward Geiselman, Judges’ Cautionary
Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
31 (1996).

For eyewitness statements 7 through 11, the judges were
also asked which, if any, of five legal safeguards (i.e., voir dire,
cross-examination, expert witness, closing argument, and jury
instruction) they would permit an attorney to use to inform a
jury about the effect of the eyewitness statement on identification accuracy. They could choose as many or as few of the five
legal safeguards as they believed were necessary. They could
also respond that they would not permit any of these safeguards or that they did not know what safeguard they would
permit. As shown in Table 4, the percentage of judges who
would permit a particular safeguard, averaged across the five
eyewitness statements, was 53% for voir dire questions, 80%
for cross-examination questions, 44% for expert witness, 74%
for closing arguments, and 24% for jury instructions. Of the
judges, 35% would not permit expert testimony for any of the
five eyewitness statements, even though expert testimony is the
only safeguard that has been shown to be effective in increasing jurors’ sensitivity to eyewitness factors.44
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

13. Jurors know how most eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy. Researchers have used questionnaires,
prediction studies, and simulated trials to determine how
knowledgeable jurors are about eyewitness testimony. All
three methods have shown that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors.46 In the survey, 64% of the
judges correctly disagreed that jurors know how most eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy. Accordingly, a
majority of judges in the survey realize that knowledge of
how eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy is not
just a matter of common sense.

Eyewitness statements 1 through 11 tested the judges’
knowledge of specific eyewitness factors, such as whether a hat
makes it significantly more difficult for an eyewitness to identify the perpetrator of the crime. Eyewitness statements 12
through 16 are grouped together because they all concern more
general principles of eyewitness testimony.
12. Attorneys know how most eyewitness factors affect
identification accuracy. Several studies show that attorneys have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors.45 Only
41% of the judges correctly disagreed with the statement
that attorneys know how most eyewitness factors affect
identification accuracy.

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGES OF JUDGES WHO WOULD PERMIT A
PARTICULAR LEGAL SAFEGUARD TO BE USED FOR EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 7-11.

Eyewitness
Factor

Voir
dire

Cross

Expert

Close

Jury
instru.

No
action

Don’t
know

7. Confidence
malleability
8. Weapon focus
9. Mug-shot-induced bias
10. Lineup format
11. Forgetting curve

58%

86%

45%

79%

27%

1%

6%

66%
60%
35%
46%

91%
87%
62%
72%

51%
43%
37%
44%

86%
80%
56%
70%

34%
29%
14%
17%

0%
1%
7%
6%

2%
6%
22%
13%

Average

53%

80%

44%

74%

24%

3%

10%

Note: Voir dire=voir dire questions, cross=cross-examination, expert=expert witness, close=closing argument, and jury instru.= jury instruction

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES’ RESPONSES TO EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 12-15

Topic

Strongly agree

12. Attorney’s knowledge
13. Jurors’ knowledge
14. Jurors distinguish eyewitnesses
15. Convictions solely from eyewitnesses

Agree

3%
1%
1%
5%

29%
9%
28%
18%

Neither
28%
26%
33%
29%

Disagree

Strongly disagree

40%*
51%*
31%*
36%

1%*
13%*
8%*
12%

Note: The asterisks indicate the correct answers to the eyewitness statements. There is no correct answer for eyewitness statement 15.

45. See generally John C. Brigham & Melissa P. Wolfskeil, Opinions of
Attorneys and Law Enforcement Personnel on the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identifications, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337-49 (1983);
George L. Rahaim & Stanley L. Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus
Common Sense: Juror and Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness
Accuracy, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1-15 (1982); Stinson, supra note
41; A. Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. Jones, Is the Psychology of
Eyewitness Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in
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EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 13-40 (Sally M. A. Lloyd-Bostock
& Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983).
46. See John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of
Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19-30 (1983); Saul M. Kassin
& Kimberly A. Barndollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness
Testimony: A Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1241-49 (1992); Lindsay (1981), supra note 17.

14. Jurors can distinguish between accurate and inaccurate
eyewitnesses. In several studies, researchers have staged
crimes and then had witnesses testify about the events in
mock trials. Some witnesses were accurate and some were
inaccurate, but mock jurors were generally unable to distinguish between the testimony of accurate versus inaccurate witnesses.47 The results indicated that 29% of the
judges agreed with this statement, 33% neither agreed nor
disagreed, and 39% correctly disagreed with this statement.
Accordingly, for this critical eyewitness statement, most
judges were unaware of jurors’ inability to distinguish
accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses.
15. Only in exceptional circumstances should a defendant
be convicted of a crime solely on the basis of eyewitness
testimony. Only 23% of the judges agreed with this summary statement, even though the unreliability of some eyewitness testimony, and jurors’ inability to distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses, suggests that this statement
may be true.
16. Out of 100 cases of wrongful felony convictions, how
many do you think on average would be due at least in
part to eyewitness error? A conservative estimate is that
eyewitness error occurs in at least half of all wrongful
felony convictions.48 Thirty-one judges (19%) did not
respond to this question, which suggests that many judges
were unsure how often erroneous eyewitness identifications play a role in wrongful convictions. Of the 129 judges
who responded to this eyewitness statement, the mean estimate was 37.86 cases. Only 43% of the respondents estimated that eyewitness error plays a role in at least half of
all wrongful convictions.
EDUCATION ABOUT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

Eyewitness statements 17 and 18 ascertained what types of
eyewitness educational materials the judges have been exposed
to, and whether they believe that judges should receive more
eyewitness training. The bolded statements for 17 and 18 are
not the exact statements in the survey.
17. The judges’ exposure to educational eyewitness materials. Of the judges, 71% reported that they had read a law
review or psychological article about eyewitness testimony,
26% had read a book on eyewitness testimony, and 69%
had attended a lecture or seminar on eyewitness testimony.
Only 14% of the judges reported that they had not been
exposed to any type of educational materials on eyewitness
testimony.
18. Whether judges should receive more training about eyewitness testimony. In the survey, 75% responded that
judges should receive more training on eyewitness testi-

47. Lindsay (1989), supra note 17; Lindsay (1981), supra note 17;
Wells (1979), supra note 17.
48. BORCHARD, supra note 8; Huff, supra note 4; Rattner, supra note
10; SCHECK, supra note 11.

mony, 10% responded
that judges receive adequate training, and 15%
did not know if judges
should receive more
training.

[J]udges in the
survey appear to
have a limited
understanding of
eyewitness factors,
CORRELATES OF JUDGES’
as they averaged
KNOWLEDGE OF
only about 55%
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
correct on the 14Empirical research clearly
item knowledge
identifies a correct answer for
eyewitness statements 1
scale.

through 14, and on average
for the 14 statements, judges
answered correctly 55% of the time (i.e., averaged 7.66 correct
answers). We computed correlations to ascertain whether
knowledge of eyewitness factors was related to other beliefs
about eyewitness testimony.49 Judges who were most knowledgeable, based on the number of correct answers to these 14
statements, also tended to be more critical of the value of eyewitness testimony. More knowledgeable judges were: (a) more
likely to know that eyewitness error plays an important role in
wrongful convictions (statement 16); (b) more likely to agree
that only in exceptional circumstances should a defendant be
convicted solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony (statement 15); (c) more likely to believe that jurors have limited
knowledge of eyewitness factors (judgments about jurors in
statements 7 to 11); (d) more likely to permit the use of legal
safeguards, including expert testimony to educate jurors about
eyewitness factors (judgments about safeguards in statements 7
to 11); and (e) more likely to agree that judges need more training on eyewitness factors (statement 18). Thus, greater knowledge of eyewitness factors was associated with a variety of
beliefs and behaviors that may be necessary for judges to
reduce the number of wrongful convictions.
The judges in the survey on average had practiced law for 14
years, had been on the bench for 12 years, and 76% of them had
been a prosecutor, defense attorney, or both prior to becoming
a judge. There was no significant relationship between knowledge of eyewitness factors and either legal experience, prior
criminal law experience, judicial experience, or judicial position. Thus, even extensive legal and judicial experience does
not ensure that judges know how eyewitness factors and investigative procedures affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
In summary, judges in the survey appear to have a limited
understanding of eyewitness factors, as they averaged only
about 55% correct on the 14-item knowledge scale. The judges
also showed little consensus on several important issues, such
as whether at trial, eyewitness confidence is a good indicator of
eyewitness accuracy, and if jurors can distinguish accurate from
inaccurate eyewitnesses. Many judges appeared to be unfamiliar with simultaneous lineups, with the forgetting curve, and

49. Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer (in press), What U.S. Judges
Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. (2004).
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Increasing
judges’ knowledge
of eyewitness
testimony may
be an important
step in reducing
wrongful
convictions.

with studies indicating that
half or more of all wrongful
felony convictions are due at
least in part to eyewitness
error. However, most judges
were aware of how attitudes
and expectations, administrator-blind lineups, post-event
information, weapon focus,
mug-shot-induced bias, and
confidence malleability affect
identification accuracy.

JUDGES’ BELIEFS ABOUT JURORS’ KNOWLEDGE OF
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

The most frequent reason judges give for not permitting an
eyewitness expert to testify during a trial is their belief that the
subject matter of the expert’s testimony is already within the
knowledge of the jurors.50 For each of the five eyewitness statements (7-11) where judges were asked if jurors know the correct answer to the statement, a majority of the judges
responded that jurors did not know the answer. For each of the
five statements, judges were much more likely to know the correct answer themselves than to believe that jurors know the
correct answer. On statement 13, 64% of the judges disagreed
with the statement that jurors know how most eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy. Thus, contrary to what published judicial opinions sometimes suggest, judges appear to
believe that jurors have a limited understanding of eyewitness
factors. On the other hand, the judges’ beliefs about jurors’
knowledge of eyewitness testimony may simply reflect their
own difficulty in responding to the questionnaire.

respondents to the questionnaire were state trial judges. Only
7% of the judges who completed the survey were federal
judges, and only 4% were appellate judges. We suspect that
judges who voluntarily participated in the survey were more
interested in and perhaps more knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony than judges in general.
Another limitation is that we asked judges about only a
small subset of factors affecting identification accuracy, and so
their knowledge scores may not represent their true knowledge
about eyewitness testimony. However, we asked mainly about
issues that have strong empirical support and that frequently
arise in many criminal trials involving eyewitness testimony.51
We avoided issues where there is less empirical support and
consensus among experts, such as the effects of stress on memory, and more esoteric issues, such as the nature of repressed
memories.
CONCLUSIONS

Although there are several potential limitations to the study,
we believe our results are still valid and informative. Some
incorrect judgments about statements 1 through 14 may represent misinterpretations of the statements, rather than lack of
knowledge. For example, some judges may have interpreted
statement 11 as forgetting the event itself, as opposed to the
details of the event. Another limitation may be that the primary

Increasing judges’ knowledge of eyewitness testimony may
be an important step in reducing wrongful convictions. More
knowledgeable judges were more aware of the dangers of convicting defendants solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony;
more willing to permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony; and more aware that jurors have limited knowledge of
eyewitness factors. Increasing judges’ knowledge of eyewitness
testimony is also important because expert testimony is not a
panacea for erroneous eyewitness testimony. Expert testimony
is effective in only some circumstances.52 It is also expensive
and time-consuming, and there are a limited number of
experts.53 Accordingly, the long-term solution to erroneous eyewitness identifications may lie in educating judges and the
other participants in the criminal justice system (e.g., police,
lawyers, and jurors) about eyewitness factors and procedures to
minimize eyewitness error, so that expert testimony would be
less necessary in criminal cases. It may also be possible for
judges who are knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony in
some criminal cases to draft jury instructions and conduct trials in such a manner that expert testimony would not be
needed.
The present study suggests that current judicial educational
materials on eyewitness materials have limited effectiveness.
This may occur because judges’ exposure to eyewitness materials may be too brief, infrequent, and superficial to be of benefit. Fisher discusses very similar problems in training police
officers to use more effective interviewing techniques with eyewitnesses.54
Perhaps another reason for the limited effectiveness of judicial education is that the primary focus of the legal system is to
detect witnesses who are lying and not witnesses who make
erroneous identifications. Thus, the legal system requires witnesses to take an oath to tell the truth and makes perjury a
crime. On the other hand, witnesses are not required to swear
that they will use reasonable care when making an identifica-

50. See United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104-05 (7th Cir. 1999).
51. See Kassin, supra note 2.
52. See Cutler, supra note 44; CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 23.

53. Wells, supra note 29.
54. See generally, Ronald P. Fisher, Interviewing Victims and Witnesses
of Crime, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 732-64 (1995).

EDUCATION ABOUT EYEWITNESS FACTORS

Judges’ self-reported exposure to educational materials on
eyewitness testimony (e.g., reading a book) was only marginally related to knowledge of eyewitness factors. This result suggests that current educational materials may have limited effectiveness in teaching judges about eyewitness factors.
Furthermore, 75% of the judges agreed that judges should
receive more training on eyewitness testimony, and only 10%
stated that judges receive adequate training on eyewitness testimony. Thus, most judges in the survey recognized a need for
more judicial training on eyewitness testimony.
LIMITATIONS
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tion, and there is no sanction for an erroneous identification
even if it is made recklessly. In sum, until judges realize that
erroneous eyewitness identifications pose a grave threat to the
validity of criminal verdicts, judicial education programs on
eyewitness testimony are likely to continue to have limited
effectiveness. Indeed, an analysis of the first 62 cases involving
post-conviction DNA exoneration found that mistaken identification occurred in 52 cases, whereas false witness testimony
occurred in just 15 cases.55
Although it is unrealistic to expect judges to become eyewitness experts, they need at least to understand the basic
principles of eyewitness testimony if they are to reduce the
number of erroneous eyewitness identifications. We make a
few suggestions about what judges need to know about eyewitness testimony, and recommend that Brigham,56 Technical
Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence,57 and Wells58 be consulted for a more detailed discussion.
1. Although human memory can be reasonably accurate, it
does not operate like a passive security camera. Memory of
a crime is not preserved like a videotape with near-perfect
fidelity, and it cannot simply be rewound and replayed to
extract additional, accurate information. Some information
may never be recorded, and forgetting of details can occur
rapidly (statements 1, 2, 8, and 11). Moreover, recall of a
crime is a partially reconstructive process, with witnesses
filling in the “blanks” of what they perceived by adding
information based on both their expectancies and information obtained after the crime (see statements 3 and 5). As
Wells states: “The important point is that witnesses will
extract and incorporate new information after the witnessed event and then testify about that information as
though they actually witnessed it.”59 Thus, many factors
can affect how accurately a witness remembers a crime,
whom the witness identifies as the perpetrator of the crime,
and the witness’s level of confidence at trial. Accordingly,
the finder of fact should always carefully analyze both the
witnessing conditions and the investigative procedures that
may have affected the witness’s testimony, rather than
assuming that a witness’s testimony is accurate simply
because the witness is testifying in good faith and with a
high degree of confidence (statements 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10).
2. Eyewitness error is the primary cause of wrongful convictions not because it is inherently unreliable, but rather
because the criminal justice system has not yet implemented many procedural safeguards that could significantly reduce the number of erroneous eyewitness identifications.60 For example, a few procedural changes in how
lineups are conducted, such as the use of administratorblind lineups and sequential rather than simultaneous lineups (see statements 4 and 10), could greatly reduce the
number of erroneous eyewitness identifications without

affecting the number of
Knowledge
accurate identifications.61
of eyewitness
Judges should require that
police and prosecutors
testimony is not
implement such procejust a matter of
dures in criminal cases
common sense.
and realize that the failure
to use them significantly
Therefore, judges
increases the risk of erroneed to be more
neous eyewitness identificautious in
cations. In addition, they
excluding the
should consider suppressing evidence obtained
testimony of
from biased procedures.
eyewitness
3. Knowledge of eyewitness
experts . . . .
testimony is not just a
matter of common sense.
Therefore, judges need to be more cautious in excluding
the testimony of eyewitness experts because of their belief
that jurors already know how an eyewitness factor or procedure affects identification accuracy. Moreover, extensive
legal and judicial experience is not sufficient to ensure that
participants in the criminal justice system know how eyewitness factors and procedures affect identification accuracy. Accordingly, not only jurors but also the other participants in the criminal justice system have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors and procedures. This finding
means that jurors, law officers, and attorneys, as well as
judges, need to be better educated about eyewitness factors
and the impact of investigative procedures on eyewitness
identifications.
4. The only legal safeguard that has been empirically shown to
be effective in educating jurors about eyewitness testimony
is expert testimony. Other legal safeguards, such as voir dire
questions, cross-examination, etc., may be useful adjuncts
to expert testimony. Empirical research indicates that jurors
cannot distinguish accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses.
Although eyewitness experts cannot tell jurors if an eyewitness has made an accurate identification, they can educate jurors about eyewitness factors and procedures. With
this information, jurors can better evaluate the likelihood
that an eyewitness has made an accurate identification of
the perpetrator of a crime.
5. A greater dialogue between judges and eyewitness
researchers about eyewitness testimony would be very useful in reducing eyewitness error because both groups could
benefit from the others’ experiences and expertise. A collaboration between judges and eyewitness experts is also
important because, as Wells points out, the “scientific study
of eyewitness memory is a continuing process.”62
Accordingly, it is important that judges stay abreast of the

55. SCHECK, supra note 11.
56. Brigham, supra note 2.
57. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999).
58. Wells, supra note 12.
59. Id. at 583.

60. See generally id.
61. See Dep’t Justice’s Recommendations for the Collection and
Preservation of Eyewitness Evidence, TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP
FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 57.
62. Wells, supra note 12, at 590.
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latest scientific research on eyewitness testimony and that
researchers receive feedback from judges on how best to
implement their findings into the criminal justice system.
Moreover, because scientific knowledge is constantly evolving as a result of new research and new methods, our
knowledge of how eyewitness factors and procedures affect
eyewitness accuracy will never be complete. There will
always be some experts who disagree with the majority of
experts on how eyewitness factors and procedures affect
accuracy.63 Incomplete knowledge, controversies, and disagreements are inherent in the nature of scientific research.
Consequently, if judges exclude the testimony of eyewitness
experts merely because scientific knowledge on a topic is
incomplete or because there is some disagreement among
experts, then judges will be excluding eyewitness experts
because of a misconception about the nature of scientific
research. They will also be depriving fact finders of an
essential tool for minimizing eyewitness error.
Judges are the guardians of the judicial system, and with
increased knowledge about eyewitness testimony, they may
be able to meaningfully address the problem of wrongful
convictions. Reducing wrongful convictions is essential
because the continual discovery of wrongful convictions
undermines the credibility of the legal system. Reducing
wrongful convictions is also vital because they cause incalculable suffering both to the innocent persons who are
wrongfully convicted and to the victims of crimes that are
committed because the real perpetrator of a crime has not
been brought to justice.

63. Howard Egeth, Expert Psychological Testimony about Eyewitnesses:
An Update, in PSYCHOLOGY, SCIENCE, AND HUMAN AFFAIRS: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF WILLIAM BEVAN 151-66 (Frank Kessel ed., 1995);
Rogers Elliott, Expert Testimony about Eyewitness Identification: A
Critique, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 423-37 (1993).
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